Skip to main content

Canada’s Senate examines Bill C-22’s data retention and encryption limits

The draft law would set duties for digital services before an investigation makes a request. Its decryption clause and metadata rules address different risks.

A red padlock-shaped sculpture beside blank sheets on a wooden table
TechKili · AI-generated editorial illustration with Cloudflare FLUX
Share this article:
In this article

Canada’s Senate is examining whether electronic service providers should have to prepare their systems to supply data in legally authorized investigations. Bill C-22 would let the government set technical requirements and require the retention of some metadata. The proposal remains before a Senate committee, so those obligations have yet to take effect.

The committee’s November 16, 2026 agenda listed Meta, Signal and Tailscale alongside legal and civil liberties witnesses. The November 18 notice listed child protection and law enforcement representatives. On November 16, MacRumors reported that Apple welcomed revisions to the proposed law while maintaining that it would undermine the company’s ability to protect user data. Apple’s May 22 brief addressed the earlier text before the House passed amendments in June.

What a request can obtain and what providers would have to keep

The Canadian government’s explanation separates legal authority in a case, such as a warrant or a court order for records, from the provider’s ability to supply the information. The government argues that standardizing this ability would help investigators obtain authorized information more promptly. Part 1 of the House-passed bill also proposes changes to investigative powers, including a court order for specified subscriber information already held or controlled by a provider.

Part 2 deals with the obligations services could face before a request arrives. Regulations could set technical capabilities for classes of core providers and require retention of essential categories of metadata for reasonable periods of up to six months. That rulemaking power excludes information that would reveal the substance of communications, a person’s browsing history or their social media activity. The bill also allows provider-specific ministerial orders, including for providers outside a core class, subject to approval by the Intelligence Commissioner. Those requirements concern what a service must be able to supply. Authority to obtain someone’s data still has its own legal basis and conditions.

Where the bill draws the line on decryption

Part 2 says its duties cannot be interpreted to compel decryption unless the provider both supplied the encryption and already possesses the information needed to decrypt. The bill also excuses compliance with core-provider regulations or ministerial orders that would introduce a systemic vulnerability or prevent its repair. The definition turns on a credible risk of unauthorized access under recognized international technical standards. It excludes risk confined to information about people already subject to lawful access authority.

The decryption clause addresses whether a provider could be required to unlock information. It leaves a separate policy question for senators about the systems providers could be required to maintain and the records those systems would hold. Even when message contents stay encrypted, retaining more data about the transmission changes what records exist for a future authorized request. The scope of any such duty would depend on the final bill and the measures adopted under it.

Sources